Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004zbMath1447.91092OpenAlexW3025205327MaRDI QIDQ2195706

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Ludovic A. Julien

Publication date: 27 August 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

Walras equilibriumCournot-Nash equilibriumLeontievian preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange ⋮ Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model ⋮ Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian

Cites Work

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• A strategic market game with complete markets
• The strategic Marshallian cross
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games

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