A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.017zbMath1447.91042OpenAlexW3031537811MaRDI QIDQ2195717

Eugen Kováč, Deniz Dizdar

Publication date: 27 August 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.017

zbMATH Keywords

strong dualityBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (2)

Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ Censorship as optimal persuasion

Cites Work

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• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
• Strong Duality in Monopoly Pricing
• The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• Optimal Transport

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