Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation
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Publication:2196151
DOI10.1155/2020/3763684zbMath1441.91054OpenAlexW3034241197MaRDI QIDQ2196151
Yongxi Yi, Rongwei Xu, Zhi-Gang Chen
Publication date: 28 August 2020
Published in: Complexity (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/3763684
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Dynamic programming in optimal control and differential games (49L20) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
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Cites Work
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