Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games
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Publication:2197079
DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102332zbMath1448.91012arXiv1712.05723OpenAlexW2773834346MaRDI QIDQ2197079
Publication date: 4 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05723
strategic gamesnon-cooperative game theorytransparencycounterfactual dependenceperfect predictionnecessary knowledge of strategiesnecessary rationalitynon-Nashian game theorysuperrationality
Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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