Perfect prediction in normal form: superrational thinking extended to non-symmetric games

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102332zbMath1448.91012arXiv1712.05723OpenAlexW2773834346MaRDI QIDQ2197079

Ghislain Fourny

Publication date: 4 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.05723

zbMATH Keywords

strategic gamesnon-cooperative game theorytransparencycounterfactual dependenceperfect predictionnecessary knowledge of strategiesnecessary rationalitynon-Nashian game theorysuperrationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (1)

Study on the exit strategy selection mechanism of venture capital based on quantum game

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