When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents

DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102366zbMath1448.91093OpenAlexW3016316413MaRDI QIDQ2197098

Luisa Monroy, Amparo M. Mármol, Asunción Zapata, M. Ángeles Caraballo

Publication date: 4 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2020.102366

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriavector-valued gameother-regarding strategic modelRawlsian preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Individual preferences (91B08)

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