Proving the biases of Salsa and ChaCha in differential attack

DOI10.1007/S10623-020-00736-9zbMath1453.94075OpenAlexW3007085939MaRDI QIDQ2200515

Santanu Sarkar, Sabyasachi Dey

Publication date: 22 September 2020

Published in: Designs, Codes and Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-020-00736-9

zbMATH Keywords

biasChaChaSalsatheoretical justificationprobabilistic neutral bits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items (4)

Revamped differential-linear cryptanalysis on reduced round ChaCha ⋮ PNB-focused differential cryptanalysis of ChaCha stream cipher ⋮ Moving a step of ChaCha in syncopated rhythm ⋮ A theoretical investigation on the distinguishers of Salsa and ChaCha

Uses Software

• ChaCha
• Rumba20

Cites Work

• Chosen IV cryptanalysis on reduced round \texttt{ChaCha} and \texttt{Salsa}
• Revisiting design principles of Salsa and ChaCha
• An observation on NORX, BLAKE2, and ChaCha
• Settling the mystery of \(Z_{r} = r\) in RC4
• Improved analysis for reduced round Salsa and ChaCha
• (Non-)random sequences from (non-)random permutations -- analysis of RC4 stream cipher
• Full Plaintext Recovery Attack on Broadcast RC4
• A Practical Attack on Broadcast RC4
• New Features of Latin Dances: Analysis of Salsa, ChaCha, and Rumba
• Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round Salsa20 and ChaCha
• Non-randomness in eSTREAM Candidates Salsa20 and TSC-4

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