Two definitions of correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.001zbMath1448.91055OpenAlexW3026640882MaRDI QIDQ2201694

Andrés Perea, Christian W. Bach

Publication date: 17 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.001

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumrevelation principleepistemic game theorycorrelated equilibrium distributioncanonical correlated equilibriumone-theory-per-choice condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (2)

Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium ⋮ Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance

Cites Work

• Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect correlated equilibria
• Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
• Universal Mechanisms
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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