Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.010zbMath1448.91184OpenAlexW3047307356MaRDI QIDQ2201710

David Delacrétaz, Alexandru Nichifor, Scott Duke Kominers

Publication date: 17 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:bdfd1cc4-d1a8-452c-a0d4-51f8eae47f3b

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchingpath-independencesize-dependent discountsrespect for improvements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Full substitutability

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