Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
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Publication:2201710
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.010zbMath1448.91184OpenAlexW3047307356MaRDI QIDQ2201710
David Delacrétaz, Alexandru Nichifor, Scott Duke Kominers
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:bdfd1cc4-d1a8-452c-a0d4-51f8eae47f3b
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