Strictly strategy-proof auctions

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.07.002zbMath1450.91014arXiv1807.11864OpenAlexW3104693767MaRDI QIDQ2203494

Matteo Escudé, Ludvig Sinander

Publication date: 7 October 2020

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.11864

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessstrategy-proofauctionmechanism designdominant strategyvirtual

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Menu mechanisms

Cites Work

• Rationalizable implementation
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

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