Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.06.005zbMath1448.91007OpenAlexW3048909786MaRDI QIDQ2203498

Liang Mao

Publication date: 7 October 2020

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining powersubgame perfect equilibriumasymmetric Nash bargaining solutiontwo-player bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Nonbinding recommendations: The relative effects of focal points versus uncertainty reduction on bargaining outcomes
• Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
• Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures
• Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program
• A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
• The Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Bargaining and Value
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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