A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting

DOI10.1016/j.ipl.2020.105989zbMath1466.91110arXiv1808.09226OpenAlexW2889498819MaRDI QIDQ2203580

Sven Kosub, Julian Müller

Publication date: 7 October 2020

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.09226

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputational social choiceSchulze voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Social choice (91B14) Mathematical economics and fuzziness (91B86)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Barriers to Manipulation in Voting

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