Social preference under twofold uncertainty

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01237-0zbMath1451.91059OpenAlexW3008433226WikidataQ126788851 ScholiaQ126788851MaRDI QIDQ2206001

Philippe Mongin, Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 21 October 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71776/1/MPRA_paper_71776.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principleseparabilityspurious unanimity\textit{ex ante} social welfare\textit{ex post} social welfarecomplementary ignoranceHarsanyi social aggregation theoremobjective versus subjective probabilityobjective versus subjective uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (13)

Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence ⋮ On stochastic independence under ambiguity ⋮ Rawls's difference principle and maximin rule of allocation: a new analysis ⋮ Philippe Mongin 1950--2020 ⋮ Efficiency, equity, and social rationality under uncertainty ⋮ Fair management of social risk ⋮ Subjective expected utility through stochastic independence ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Utilitarianism with and without expected utility ⋮ Philippe Mongin (1950-2020) ⋮ Fully Bayesian aggregation ⋮ Belief-averaging and relative utilitarianism ⋮ Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Separate aggregation of beliefs and values under ambiguity
• A theorem for Bayesian group decisions
• The veil of public ignorance
• Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects
• Combining probability distributions: A critique and an annotated bibliography
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• The paradox of the Bayesian experts and state-dependent utility theory
• Bayesian group agents and two modes of aggregation
• A case for incomplete markets
• Knightian decision theory. I.
• Consistent Bayesian aggregation
• Fair social decision under uncertainty and belief disagreements
• Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties
• Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto
• Flipping and ex post aggregation
• Optimal Production and Allocation Under Uncertainty
• Utilitarian Preferences With Multiple Priors
• Preference Aggregation With Incomplete Information
• No-Betting-Pareto Dominance
• A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
• The Structure of Utility Functions
• A Definition of Subjective Probability

This page was built for publication: Social preference under twofold uncertainty