Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs

DOI10.1007/S00199-019-01227-2zbMath1452.91166OpenAlexW2976898724WikidataQ127181322 ScholiaQ127181322MaRDI QIDQ2206006

Sérgio O. Parreiras, Anna Rubinchik

Publication date: 21 October 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01227-2

zbMATH Keywords

homogeneityincomplete informationmean-preserving spreadgroup compositionprivate values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (1)

Ability grouping in contests

Cites Work

• Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Lottery versus all-pay auction contests: a revenue dominance theorem
• Contest design and heterogeneity
• Contest architecture
• Optimal Auction Design

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