Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
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Publication:2206008
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01230-7zbMath1451.91079OpenAlexW2979899449MaRDI QIDQ2206008
Ruben Juarez, Miguel Vargas, Kohei Nitta
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01230-7
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Related Items (3)
Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms ⋮ Separable rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues ⋮ Coalitional efficient profit-sharing
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