Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2206010
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4zbMath1451.91057OpenAlexW2982519948WikidataQ109044451 ScholiaQ109044451MaRDI QIDQ2206010
Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4
Related Items
Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust coalitional implementation ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power ⋮ On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Implementation in differential information economies
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- A social choice rule and its implementation in perfect equilibrium
- Repeated implementation
- Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Efficient Repeated Implementation
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The Bargaining Problem
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Toward Natural Implementation
- Implementation with evidence
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
