Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007zbMath1452.91223OpenAlexW3034459921MaRDI QIDQ2206795

Xiaohan Zhong, Binzhen Wu

Publication date: 26 October 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

mismatchBoston mechanismstrategic behaviorChinese college admissionsmatching inequality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions

Cites Work

• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
• Constrained school choice
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Matching in the large: an experimental study
• The instability of matching with overconfident agents
• College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• School choice: an experimental study
• Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities

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