Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
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Publication:2206800
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.06.004zbMath1452.91212OpenAlexW3038753102MaRDI QIDQ2206800
Jonathan Newton, Leonardo Boncinelli, Ennio Bilancini
Publication date: 26 October 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1206562
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