Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109251zbMath1451.91033OpenAlexW3029051701MaRDI QIDQ2208639

Jingfeng Lu, Dongri Liu, Bin Liu

Publication date: 3 November 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109251

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectiondynamic mechanism designshifting supports

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites Work

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