Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109443zbMath1451.91098OpenAlexW3045623423MaRDI QIDQ2208886

Jin Hyuk Choi, Kookyoung Han

Publication date: 4 November 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109443

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppinginformation acquisitionoptimal contractprivate observation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items

Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option

Cites Work

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