Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.024zbMath1451.92229OpenAlexW2146419044WikidataQ36676744 ScholiaQ36676744MaRDI QIDQ2210109

Martin A. Nowak, Jorge M. Pacheco, Hisashi Ohtsuki

Publication date: 5 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2396517

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theorypopulation structureevolutionary dynamicsreplicator equationevolutionary graph theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (38)

Modelling evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer interactions ⋮ Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs ⋮ Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations ⋮ Strategy selection in structured populations ⋮ Evolving cooperation ⋮ The predator-dependent replicator dynamics ⋮ Reproductive value in graph-structured populations ⋮ A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks ⋮ Evolution of cooperation driven by collective interdependence on multilayer networks ⋮ Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint ⋮ Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population ⋮ Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection ⋮ Impact of neighborhood separation on the spatial reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Structured heterogeneity of network in evolutionary social dilemmas under assortative linking and learning ⋮ Effect of information transmission on cooperative behavior ⋮ Spectral dynamics of guided edge removals and identifying transient amplifiers for death-birth updating ⋮ Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration ⋮ From inclusive fitness to fixation probability in homogeneous structured populations ⋮ The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities ⋮ Evolution of cooperation for multiple mutant configurations on all regular graphs with \(N \leq 14\) players ⋮ Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Prisoner’s dilemma on directed networks ⋮ Exact formulas for fixation probabilities on a complete oriented star ⋮ The effect of network topology on optimal exploration strategies and the evolution of cooperation in a mobile population ⋮ Public cooperation in two-layer networks with asymmetric interaction and learning environments ⋮ Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner's dilemma players ⋮ Multi-player games on the cycle ⋮ An asymptotic analysis of the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma on a path ⋮ Spectral analysis of transient amplifiers for death-birth updating constructed from regular graphs ⋮ Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking ⋮ Evolutionary stability on graphs ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of fairness on graphs with migration ⋮ Evolution of staying together in the context of diffusible public goods ⋮ An extension of the Moran process using type-specific connection graphs ⋮ Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of nonlinear social dilemmas ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation ⋮ Effects of strategy switching and network topology on decision-making in multi-agent systems

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