Crying about a strategic wolf: a theory of crime and warning

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105094zbMath1452.91049OpenAlexW3043961701MaRDI QIDQ2211485

Vincent Conitzer, Aaron M. Kolb

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105094

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescheap talkcybersecuritynational securitywarning systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Dynamic communication with biased senders
• A Theory of Credibility
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Bad Reputation
• Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
• Torture and the Commitment Problem
• Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games

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