Bargaining under liquidity constraints: unified strategic foundations of the Nash and Kalai solutions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105098zbMath1453.91052OpenAlexW3044834716MaRDI QIDQ2211488

Tai-Wei Hu, Guillaume Rocheteau

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/86d3d2ce-d5a6-449d-8d3e-e328b671a556

zbMATH Keywords

Nash programbargaining solutionbargaining with an agendaextensive-form bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Endogenous liquidity and volatility ⋮ Credit frictions and participation in over-the-counter markets

Cites Work

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