The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015zbMath1452.91219OpenAlexW2986934952MaRDI QIDQ2212761

Rui Tang, Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2303

zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferencestable matchingslattice structureone-sided preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Structure theory of lattices (06B05) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings ⋮ Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy

Cites Work

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• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
• What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory
• Revealed Preference Theory
• On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model^∗

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