Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.005zbMath1452.91168arXiv1002.2477OpenAlexW2017101975MaRDI QIDQ2212790

Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1002.2477

zbMATH Keywords

utilityrisk-aversionrevenue maximizationoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

Cites Work

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• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Price of Correlations in Stochastic Optimization
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Mean, Median and Mode in Binomial Distributions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Maximizing a Submodular Set Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint (Extended Abstract)

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