Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01232-3zbMath1454.91071OpenAlexW2994931429WikidataQ126587916 ScholiaQ126587916MaRDI QIDQ2217350

Kotaro Suzumura, Walter Bossert

Publication date: 29 December 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01232-3

zbMATH Keywords

plurality rulelexicographic extensionsindividual rankingspositionalist voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Scoring indices, top-truncated preferences, and splitting invariance, Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited, Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights, Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness

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