Extreme donors and policy convergence

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01234-1zbMath1454.91072OpenAlexW2997327182WikidataQ126418314 ScholiaQ126418314MaRDI QIDQ2217353

Daisuke Hirata, Yuichiro Kamada

Publication date: 29 December 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01234-1

zbMATH Keywords

two-stage gamecampaign contributionstwo-candidate election model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

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