Metrizable preferences over preferences
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Publication:2217354
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01235-0zbMath1454.91070OpenAlexW2998144430WikidataQ126412047 ScholiaQ126412047MaRDI QIDQ2217354
M. Remzi Sanver, Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean
Publication date: 29 December 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01235-0
Cites Work
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