Metrizable preferences over preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01235-0zbMath1454.91070OpenAlexW2998144430WikidataQ126412047 ScholiaQ126412047MaRDI QIDQ2217354

M. Remzi Sanver, Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean

Publication date: 29 December 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01235-0

zbMATH Keywords

neutralityhyper-preferenceKemeny extension rulemetrizable extension rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Cites Work

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