Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects
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Publication:2218542
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01316-7zbMath1455.91151OpenAlexW3089392410MaRDI QIDQ2218542
Ana Elisa Pereira, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Adriana Gama
Publication date: 15 January 2021
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01316-7
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Cites Work
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