Contests with insurance

DOI10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5zbMath1455.91117OpenAlexW3122000542MaRDI QIDQ2218543

Aner Sela, Yizhaq Minchuk

Publication date: 15 January 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5

zbMATH Keywords

insuranceall-pay auctionscontestsreimbursement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Related Items (2)

Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest

Cites Work

• Sad-loser contests
• Sequential two-prize contests
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Manipulations in contests
• Contest architecture
• Optimal Auction Design
• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
• Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction

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