Consistency, anonymity, and the core on the domain of convex games

DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00231-6zbMath1455.91024OpenAlexW2187237612MaRDI QIDQ2218555

Yukihiko Funaki, Toru Hokari, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date: 15 January 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutter/ivoe/disc_papers/disc_2019/dpbe13_2019.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreindividual rationalitysuper-additivitynon-emptinessconvex TU gamesmax consistencyPeleg's axioms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Hart-Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency

Cites Work

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• The positive core of a cooperative game
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Reduced games, consistency, and the core
• A new axiomatization of the core of games with transferable utility
• On extreme points of the core and reduced games
• Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains
• Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games
• Cores of convex games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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