Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
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Publication:2218556
DOI10.1007/s10058-020-00233-4zbMath1455.91114OpenAlexW3032972026MaRDI QIDQ2218556
Publication date: 15 January 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00233-4
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values
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