Repeated coordination with private learning

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105106zbMath1457.91065arXiv1809.00051OpenAlexW2891340194MaRDI QIDQ2220921

Tetsuya Hoshino, Pathikrit Basu, Omer Tamuz, Kalyan Chatterjee

Publication date: 25 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.00051

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescoordinationprivate learningcommon learninglearning from actions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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