What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design
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Publication:2220932
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120zbMath1457.91268OpenAlexW3092111482MaRDI QIDQ2220932
Publication date: 25 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105120
Related Items (4)
Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
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