Matching with myopic and farsighted players
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2220937
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105125zbMath1457.91272OpenAlexW2611970179MaRDI QIDQ2220937
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Publication date: 25 January 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105125
Related Items (13)
Network formation with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Close-knit neighborhoods: stability of cooperation in networks ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Coalition formation under dominance invariance ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation ⋮ Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks ⋮ Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks ⋮ A bargaining set for roommate problems ⋮ Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs ⋮ Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness ⋮ Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Pillage and property
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- Farsightedly stable networks
- A note on generalized stable sets
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Networks and farsighted stability
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- Rationalizability for social environments
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- Coalition formation and history dependence
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- The Farsighted Stable Set
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set
- The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Matching with myopic and farsighted players
