Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication

DOI10.3390/g11020018zbMath1457.91098OpenAlexW2990319123MaRDI QIDQ2221263

Ismail Saglam, Mehmet Yiğit Gürdal, Esra E. Bayindir, Ayça Özdoğan

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020018

zbMATH Keywords

truststrategic information transmissionsender-receiver gametruth-telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Delegation based on cheap talk ⋮ Experiments on communication in games: introduction to the special issue

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games with intervention: an experimental study
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Credible debate equilibria
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
• Enjoy the silence: An experiment on truth-telling
• The limited value of a second opinion: competition and exaggeration in experimental cheap talk games
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• A Model of Expertise
• Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Communication with multiple senders: An experiment
• Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

This page was built for publication: Cheap talk games with two-senders and different modes of communication