Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.005zbMath1457.91271OpenAlexW3090166707MaRDI QIDQ2222218

James C. D. Fisher

Publication date: 26 January 2021

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityexistencematchingdeferred acceptanceinfinite contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

Cites Work

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