Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2020.110476zbMath1457.91074OpenAlexW3092836421WikidataQ100697563 ScholiaQ100697563MaRDI QIDQ2225948

Madhur Anand, Isaiah Farahbakhsh, Chris T. Bauch

Publication date: 11 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110476

zbMATH Keywords

self-organized criticalityevolutionary game theorytragedy of commonssocial-ecological systemscoupled human-and-natural systemshuman-environment systemsnetwork game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22) Social learning (91D15)

Related Items (1)

General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics

Uses Software

• plfit
• Powerlaw

Cites Work

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• Spatial evolutionary dynamics produce a negative cooperation-population size relationship
• Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
• Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• Self-organized criticality
• Power-Law Distributions in Empirical Data
• Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation.
• Steering eco-evolutionary game dynamics with manifold control
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks

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