\textsc{Cerberus} channels: incentivizing watchtowers for Bitcoin

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_19zbMath1459.94092OpenAlexW2982293509MaRDI QIDQ2226597

Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Roger Wattenhofer, Z. Avarikioti

Publication date: 8 February 2021

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_19

zbMATH Keywords

collateralsecurityincentivesBitcoinlightning networkpayment channelspayment networkwatchtowers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20)

Related Items (5)

FPPW: a fair and privacy preserving watchtower for bitcoin ⋮ \textsc{Brick}: asynchronous incentive-compatible payment channels ⋮ \textsc{Hide} \& \textsc{Seek}: privacy-preserving rebalancing on payment channel networks ⋮ Suborn channels: incentives against timelock bribes ⋮ Maravedí: a secure and practical protocol to trade risk for instantaneous finality

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