Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109615zbMath1457.91229OpenAlexW3092264632MaRDI QIDQ2226853

Heng Liu, Gagan Ghosh

Publication date: 9 February 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot competitionno commitmentverifiable information disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma
• Strategic Information Revelation

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