Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109616zbMath1457.91180OpenAlexW3092305869MaRDI QIDQ2226854

Ratul Lahkar, Saptarshi Mukherjee

Publication date: 9 February 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper36.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsexternalitiesVCG mechanismPigouvian pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

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An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation

Cites Work

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• Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
• Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
• Comparative statics for aggregative games. The strong concavity case
• Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

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