Using the extraproximal method for computing the shortest-path mixed Lyapunov equilibrium in Stackelberg security games

DOI10.1016/j.matcom.2016.12.010OpenAlexW2577921554WikidataQ115039766 ScholiaQ115039766MaRDI QIDQ2229090

Alexander S. Poznyak, Julio B. Clempner

Publication date: 19 February 2021

Published in: Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matcom.2016.12.010

zbMATH Keywords

finite Markov chainsextraproximal methodsecurity gamesstrong Stackelberg equilibriumLyapunov games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Conference proceedings and collections of articles (00Bxx) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (7)

Learning Machiavellian strategies for manipulation in Stackelberg security games ⋮ On Lyapunov Game Theory Equilibrium: Static and Dynamic Approaches ⋮ Multiscale control of Stackelberg games ⋮ Dr. Alexander Semionovich Poznyak Gorbatch: Biography ⋮ Setting Nash Versus Kalai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Approach: Computing the Continuous-Time Controllable Markov Game ⋮ Adapting attackers and defenders patrolling strategies: a reinforcement learning approach for Stackelberg security games ⋮ Handling a Kullback--Leibler divergence random walk for scheduling effective patrol strategies in Stackelberg security games

Cites Work

• Computing the Stackelberg/Nash equilibria using the extraproximal method: convergence analysis and implementation details for Markov chains games
• On \(\varepsilon\)-equilibrium point in a noncooperative \(n\)-person game
• Convergence method, properties and computational complexity for Lyapunov games
• Security and Game Theory
• A STATISTICAL MODEL OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR
• Set-theoretic methods in control
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