Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105314zbMath1471.91054OpenAlexW3183103978MaRDI QIDQ2231392

Felipe Balmaceda

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105314

zbMATH Keywords

reputationtransparencyexpertsaccountabilitynon-common priorsprivate and public communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
• On Transparency in Organizations
• Is Transparency To No Avail?*
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols

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