A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105131zbMath1475.91088OpenAlexW2618705642MaRDI QIDQ2231399

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104406/1/MPRA_paper_104406.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofness random social choice functions betweenness property generalized intermediate domains tops-restricted random min-max rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions ⋮ The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

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