Manipulability in school choice
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Publication:2231403
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105313zbMath1471.91341OpenAlexW3190064945MaRDI QIDQ2231403
Benoit Decerf, Martin Van der Linden
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105313
Related Items (3)
Parallel markets in school choice ⋮ Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents ⋮ Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable
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