Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105320zbMath1471.91598OpenAlexW3191564279MaRDI QIDQ2231404

Prabal Roy Chowdhury, Kaniska Dam

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105320

zbMATH Keywords

counter-cyclical monitoringmultiple-bank lendingsyndicated lendingvertical collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40)

Cites Work

• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship
• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• Collusion in Hierarchical Agency

This page was built for publication: Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats