Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105321zbMath1471.91355OpenAlexW3184516825MaRDI QIDQ2231405

Hiroaki Sakamoto, Larry S. Karp

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105321

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gameclimate changeenvironmental agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Global refunding and climate change
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements
• Noisy Stochastic Games
• Estimating Strategic Models of International Treaty Formation
• Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel in General Equilibrium

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