Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105327zbMath1471.91245OpenAlexW3189073883MaRDI QIDQ2231414

Kym Pram

Publication date: 29 September 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105327

zbMATH Keywords

privacyadverse selectionmechanism designdisclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Monopoly and product quality
• On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Insurance as a lemons market: coverage denials and pooling
• Private Information and Insurance Rejections
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Price discrimination through communication
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection

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