English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
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Publication:2231415
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105328zbMath1471.91193OpenAlexW3188097360MaRDI QIDQ2231415
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/discussion_paper/48.pdf
English auctionrevenue equivalenceVickrey auctionexpectations-based loss aversiondynamic loss aversionJapanese auction
Related Items (3)
Loss aversion in sequential auctions ⋮ Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
Cites Work
- Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
- Axiomatic utility theories with the betweenness property
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
- A review of WTA/WTP studies
- Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction
- Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
- A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
- Optimal Auction Design
- Regular prices and sales
- Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Life-Cycle Consumption
- Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle
- Cursed Equilibrium
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
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