Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
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Publication:2231425
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105345zbMath1471.91339OpenAlexW3197140288MaRDI QIDQ2231425
Publication date: 29 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105345
Matching models (91B68) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Related Items (9)
Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis ⋮ Aiding applicants: leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism ⋮ Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ School choice with costly information acquisition ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism
Uses Software
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