A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions

DOI10.1155/2021/5592402zbMath1471.91183OpenAlexW3198808562MaRDI QIDQ2232676

Mingming Gong, Shu-Lin Liu

Publication date: 8 October 2021

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5592402

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case
• Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

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